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Alea Capta Est: Foucault’s Dispositif and Capturing Chance  
Nick Hardy, University of New Brunswick  
 
ABSTRACT: It is somewhat of a mystery why one of Foucault's most important concepts—
that of ‘dispositif’—is still quite vague in social and political theory; and while a small num-
ber of analyses have moved understanding forward, it remains stubbornly opaque. This 
paper argues that a strengthening of Foucault's concept can be achieved by (i) integrating 
elements of Althusser’s formulation of a dispositif (with its links to aleatory (‘chance’) 
events), and (ii) a detailed examination of the shared conceptual history between dispositifs 
and discursive formations. Regarding (i), the paper contends that dispositifs restrict three 
types of aleatory event: first, a ‘continuous present’ exerted upon objects and subjects; sec-
ond, overdetermining repetitious occurrences; and third, negating the effects of unexpected 
aleatory events. The paper also argues that dispositifs are capable of producing certain forms 
of aleatory change. Regarding (ii), four developmental thresholds of dispositifs are identi-
fied: strategic emergence, political elaboration, overdetermined a priori, and aleatory domi-
nance. These two developments are argued to move Foucault's concept from being descrip-
tive and largely passive to becoming a more theoretically active resource—what Deleuze 
terms changing the analytical (i.e. analysis of the past) to the diagnostic (i.e. interrogation of 
the present).  
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Introduction  
Giving orders for his armies to cross the Rubicon river and march upon the city of Rome, 
Julius Caesar knew he was breaking Senate law and would, as a result, be deemed an insur-
rectionist. The Rubicon marked the northernmost boundary of the city’s territory and all 
standing armies were barred from entering. While a multitude of outcomes were possible 
for Caesar they would, arguably, now resolve themselves into three broad categories: victo-
ry (taking control of Rome), death (on the battlefield, after a trial by a victorious Senate, 
etc.), or life as a fugitive (from military stalemate, military defeat but escape, etc.). Caesar 
captured this high-stakes gamble in the following expression: alea iacta est, “the die has been 
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cast.”1 Chance—the ‘aleatory’—had now taken on an increased level of uncertainty.2 His 
actions in taking and holding Rome, Caesar displayed the traits Machiavelli would later ar-
gue were found in a ‘Prince’: fortuna (fortune) and virtù (virtue)—to have favourable cir-
cumstances but also to successfully exploit them.3 But if alea iacta est, why not alea capta est?4 
If a die can be thrown, can it not also be caught? It is engaging with one possible answer to 
this question that this paper is focused.  
It is somewhat of a mystery why one of Michel Foucault's most important con-
cepts—that of a ‘dispositif’—is still quite vague in social and political theory. Dispositifs are 
important because it is through them that Foucault argues dominant groups are able to con-
tinually restructure conflicting meanings, discourses, or forces and to ‘capture’ chance 
events. Its vagueness can be partially forgiven due to both the problems of translating the 
French term into English but also because Foucault himself was ambiguous in his use of it.5 
However, even while recent analyses by Bussolini, Veyne, Agamben, and Datta, as well as 
some older engagements by Deleuze and Brenner, have moved the understanding of Fou-
cault’s dispositif forward, it remains stubbornly opaque.6  
The aim of this paper is to overcome some of this opacity by focusing on three areas. 
First, by detailing in Foucault’s work his varied use of dispositif, but by also drawing out 
some of the latencies Foucault created but which he leaves largely unarticulated and under-
theorised. This includes typologising dispositifs into three distinct types: dominant disposi-
tifs, proto-dispositifs, and ancien-dispositifs. This elaboration is followed by an overview of 
the above analyses which are similar to this paper in engaging with Foucaultian dispositifs.  
                                                   
1 Suetonius, The Lives of the Caesars vol. 1 [De Vita Caesarum], translated by John Carew Rolfe (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: W. Heinemann, 1935, English & Latin), 44. 
2 By this I mean not the uncertainty of “will it rain or not during my walk to work today?”, where the 
outcome is merely getting wet. The uncertainty in Caesar’s situation is now elevated to “will I and my 
army still be alive at the end of this conflict and what will be destroyed in the process?”  
3 Louis Althusser, Machiavelli and Us, edited by François Matheron, translated by Gregory Elliott (London 
& New York: Verso, 1999). 
4 “The die has been caught”. The author’s thanks go to Dr Bill Kerr in the Classics and Ancient History 
Department at The University of New Brunswick for advice on this Latin reformulation. Any subsequent 
misuse, of course, remains the author’s responsibility alone.  
5 Jeffrey Bussolini, “What is a Dispositive?”, Foucault studies, no. 10 (2010); Gregory Elliott, “Introduction: 
In the Mirror of Machiavelli”, in François Matheron (ed.), Machiavelli and Us (London & New York: Verso, 
1999); Neil Brenner, “Foucault's New Functionalism”, Theory and Society, vol. 23, no. 5 (1994).  
6 Bussolini, “What is a Dispositive?”; Paul Veyne, Foucault: His Thought, His Character, translated by Janet 
Lloyd (Polity, 2010); Giorgio Agamben, What is an Apparatus?, translated by David Kishik and Stefan 
Pedatella (Stanford, California: Stanford university Press, 2009); Ronjon Paul Datta, “Politics and 
Existence: Totems, Dispositifs and Some Striking Parallels between Durkheim and Foucault”, Journal of 
Classical Sociology, vol. 8, no. 2 (2008); Gilles Deleuze, “What is a Dispositif?”, in Timothy Armstrong (ed.) 
Michel Foucault: Philosopher (Routledge, 1992); Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, translated by Sean Hand 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006).  
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Second, this paper attempts to ‘deepen’ Foucault's concept of dispositif by comparing 
it to elements of Louis Althusser's ‘dispositive’.7 Althusser brings a very different formula-
tion and use of dispositif, but in comparing the two it becomes clear that Foucault’s concept 
can be retheorised to include productive elements from Althusser's. These elements are Al-
thusser's focus upon ‘potential’ aleatory events, rather than Foucault’s primary focus on ‘ex-
isting’ aleatory events. (This is a crude distinction between the two but is discussed in detail 
below.) The analysis argues that dispositifs engage with three distinct ‘types’ of aleatory 
event. The first is the production of a ‘continuous present’ that gives form and content to 
social existence. The second is the ‘overdetermination of repetitious events’ so that recur-
rent entities, things, and circumstances are mostly, or even totally, formed within the pa-
rameters—and therefore the ‘rules’—of a dispositif. The third is the ‘negation of unexpected 
events’, such as the ‘capture’ of prison-produced delinquency that threatened the bourgeoi-
sie; this is Foucault’s argument that a dispositif responds to “an urgent need.”8  
Third and finally, the paper concludes with an argument that dispositifs can be rethe-
orised in a manner similar to their conceptual siblings, discursive formations. The similari-
ties in terms of the constitution of the two, the relations between their elements, and the po-
liticisation and strategic nature of their conflicts (partially hidden within discursive for-
mations, but overt in dispositifs), means that Foucault's argument for discursive formations 
passing through ‘thresholds’ can be retheorised for dispositifs.9 In this way, four dispositif 
thresholds are identified: strategic emergence, political elaboration, overdetermined a priori, 
and aleatory dominance. Conceptualising dispositifs in this way means they can be more 
precisely used in theoretical accounts of social and political processes.  
It is worth concluding the introduction with a brief word about what this paper does 
not attempt to do. First, there is no attempt to systematically engage with Foucault and his 
use of chance/the aleatory across his oeuvre. Whilst a hugely interesting subject, that project 
would be, at the very least, a paper in and of itself (if not a book). This paper’s focus is on 
Foucault’s concept of dispositif and how it might be productively retheorised. Second, this 
paper does not attempt a ‘pure’ comparison between Foucault and Althusser and their sep-
arate formulations and uses of dispositifs. What is attempted here is a brief outline of Al-
thusser—building upon recent posthumous publications and secondary academic works—
and his conceptualisation of a particular form of the aleatory as the ‘created possible’. This 
is sufficient to support the claim that it can be used in a reconceptualisation of Foucault, but 
the present argument attempts to go no further than this.  
                                                   
7 It is important to note that Althusser also uses ‘dispositif’ as a term in his work, but it has been translated 
into ‘dispositive’ (Elliott, “Introduction: In the Mirror of Machiavelli”). This is different to the many other 
translations of Foucault’s dispositif into ‘apparatus’, ‘social apparatus’, ‘deployment’, or ‘system’. This dis-
cussion is returned to later in the paper.  
8 Michel Foucault, Discipine and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan Sheridan (London: 
Penguin, 1995); Michel Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh”, in Colin Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge: 
Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980).  
9 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, translated by Alan M. Sheridan (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1972).  
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Foucault's dispositif  
Dominant dispositifs  
Foucault’s use of dispositif as a concept can be found in interviews, his Collège de France 
lectures, and books. In a particularly detailed explanation, Foucault outlines what he un-
derstands a dispositif to be.  
 
[It is first], a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, archi-
tectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, 
philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in short the said, as much as the un-
said. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations 
that can be established between these elements. Secondly, what I am trying to identify in this 
apparatus is precisely the nature of the connection that can exist between these heterogene-
ous elements… In short, between these elements, whether discursive or non-discursive, 
there is a sort of interplay of shifts of position and modifications of function which can also 
vary very widely. Thirdly, I understand by the term ‘apparatus’ a sort of… formation which 
has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. 
The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function.10  
 
The three points Foucault outlines show the complex constitution of a dispositif: it has par-
ticular elements, those elements are held in a particular set of relationship vis-à-vis one an-
other, and the external effect(s) that the dispositif produces. At first glance, Foucault's ac-
count of elements may appear nothing more than an eclectic list, but in fact they correspond 
closely to his existing analyses of power at the “capillary” level, the constitution of veridical 
(‘truth’) discourses, and the extra-discursive.11, 12 Presumably each individual element in a 
dispositif has varying inherent powers or capabilities, yet Foucault argues for an additional 
important point: it is also the arrangement of elements that creates particular effects.13 There-
fore, and second, it is this arrangement—i.e. “the system of relations that can be established 
                                                   
10 Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh”, 194-195, emphasis in original.  
11 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76, edited by Mauro 
Bertani, et al. (New York: Picador, 2003, 1st ed), 27. An alternative citation is Michel Foucault, “Two 
Lectures”, in Colin Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 96. Cf. The Archaeology of Knowledge, 80; Nick Hardy, “Foucault, Genealogy, 
Emergence: Re-Examining the Extra-Discursive”, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, vol. 41, no. 1 
(2011); Paul Veyne, “Foucault Revolutionises History”, in Arnold Ira Davidson (ed.) Foucault and His 
Interlocutors (Chicago, Illinois: Univeristy of Chicago Press, 1997); Dominique Lecourt, Marxism and 
Epistemology: Bachelard, Canguilhem and Foucault (London: NLB, 1975). 
12 Veyne outlines this as the “material universe, made up of prediscursive referents that remain faceless 
potentialities” (Veyne, “Foucault Revolutionises History”, 170-171). The extra-discursive/prediscursive is 
an essential aspect of Foucault's theory but is often overlooked. As part of a dispositif, it can constitute a 
range of elements ranging from institutions to the physical bodies of the subjects contained within it.  
13 The similarity between this conception of a dispositif as a means of relating elements to one another and 
Foucault’s archaeological argument that a discursive formation “regulates the dispersal of elements” will 
be examined later.  
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between these elements”—that actually ‘constitutes’ the dispositif. The arrangement creates 
certain restrictions in how elements can relate to one another. To borrow a term from engi-
neering, the elements have a certain “tolerance” within which they can vary.14 This is im-
portant because, while variation can and does occur, problems will appear within a disposi-
tif if elements shift beyond their tolerable parameters of relationship.  
Third and finally, Foucault identifies that a dispositif operates to meet “an urgent 
need,” playing a “strategic function.” A dispositif increases the chances that a dominant 
group will be able to react to unexpected events in such a way that they maintain their 
dominant position.15 This “strategic function” shows quite clearly that Foucault under-
stands a dispositif to be dynamic: it is not monolithic in form or structure as it must continu-
ously reform both itself and the social and discursive relations connected to it or face de-
struction. As he states, 
 
On the one hand, there is a process of functional overdetermination, because each effect—
positive or negative, intentional or unintentional—enters into resonance or contradiction 
with the others and therefore calls for a readjustment or a reworking of the heterogeneous 
elements that surface at various points. On the other hand, there is a perpetual process of 
strategic elaboration.16  
 
[T]he apparatus is essentially of a strategic nature, which means assuming that it is a matter 
of a certain manipulation of relations of forces, either developing them in particular direc-
tion, blocking them, stabilising them, utilising them, etc. The apparatus is thus always in-
scribed in a play of power, but it is also always linked to certain coordinates of knowledge 
which issue from it but, to an equal degree, condition it. This is what the apparatus consists 
in: strategies of relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge. 
…[T]he apparatus in its general form is both discursive and non-discursive, its elements be-
ing much more heterogeneous.17 
 
Foucault gives an example of this “strategic nature” in his analysis of the response to the 
new delinquent-class of criminals that emerged from the new disciplinary prison system 
developed in the early nineteenth century; their co-optation into social relations was made 
possible because of the bourgeois dispositif.18 There had always been “illegalities” Foucault 
argues, acts that are (as is implied in the name) illegal against whatever law or code is in 
                                                   
14  A similar point is made by Datta, “Politics and Existence”, 228; Colin Gordon, “Governmental 
Rationality: An Introduction”, in Graham Burchell, et al. (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 20.  
15 Foucault, Discipine and Punish; Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh”.  
16 Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh”, 195, emphasis in original.  
17 Ibid., 196-197, emphasis in original.  
18 Foucault, Discipine and Punish; Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh”. See Ronjon Paul Datta, “From 
Foucault’s Genealogy to Aleatory Materialism: Realism, Nominalism and Politics”, in Frank Pearce and 
Jon Frauley (eds.), Critical Realism and the Social Sciences: Heterodox Elaborations (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2007), 289.  
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operation, but the move from sovereign power to disciplinary power altered the relation 
between power and illegalities. Disciplinary power individualised and standardised the 
previously generalised illegalities, bifurcating them into illegalities but now also delinquen-
cy:  
 
No doubt delinquency is a form of illegality; certainly it has its roots in illegality; but it is an 
illegality that the ‘carceral [prison] system’, with all its ramifications, has invested, segment-
ed, isolated, penetrated, organised, enclosed in a definite milieu, and to which it has given 
an instrumental role in relation to other illegalities. […]  
For the observation that prison fails to eliminate crime, one should perhaps substi-
tute the hypothesis that prison has succeeded extremely well in producing delinquency, a 
specific type, a politically or economically less dangerous—and, on occasion, usable—form 
of illegality; in producing delinquents, in an apparently marginal, but in fact centrally su-
pervised milieu; in producing the delinquent as a pathologised subject.19  
 
Foucault catalogues multiple effects of the disciplinary prison system: first, it created, iso-
lated, and enabled supervision over a particular type of criminality (delinquency); second, 
it aided the subversion of (some) delinquency into less harmful forms—and ones that may 
even be useful, even if still illegal; third, delinquents represent a ‘harder core’ of illegalities 
and serve to reduce the activities of other lesser illegalist offenders’ through intimidation, 
violence, and from the police supervision that continuously follows them; finally, delin-
quency had direct uses: from the deportation of European criminals to various colonial ter-
ritories, to the illicit trade in sex (i.e. prostitution), drugs, alcohol, and arms trafficking, and 
also political delinquents as agents provocateurs, informants, and a reserve source of violent 
labour (e.g. as strike breakers).20  
Why is this of interest to a discussion of dispositifs? The interest lies in the utilisation 
of the bourgeois dispositif to “recapture” the accidentally created delinquent class. As Datta 
reminds us, the bourgeois dispositif was not about discipline per se but was focused upon the 
“valorisation of a calculus… combining discipline, normalization and confinement as the 
solution to the problem of developing the most economical and efficient means of punish-
ment.”21 As Foucault states:  
 
From about the 1830s onwards, one finds an immediate re-utilisation of this unintended, 
negative effect within a new strategy which came in some sense to occupy this empty space, 
or transform the negative into a positive. The delinquent milieu came to be re-utilised for di-
verse political and economic ends, such as the extraction of pleasure through the organisa-
tion of prostitution. This is what I call the strategic completion [remplissement] of the disposi-
tif.22  
 
                                                   
19 Foucault, Discipine and Punish, 277.  
20 Ibid., 278-280.  
21 Datta, “Politics and Existence”, 295.  
22 Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh”, 196.  
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The bourgeois dispositif enabled that dominant group to incorporate an unexpected devel-
opment into an existing set of social relations. While the delinquent class could not be ‘un-
made’—for the disciplining and pathologising genie was out of the bottle—they might be 
incorporable in some way into existing relations. Foucault's account shows that dominant 
groups continually ‘ride the tiger’ of social relations: they never have absolute control over 
circumstance, relations, or effects but maintain their dominance by successfully responding 
to events in a way that allows them to either nullify the events or to benefit from them.  
To sum up the discussion so far of Foucault's use of the concept of dispositifs, they in-
itially constitute three things: a diverse number of elements, a particular set of relations be-
tween these elements, and the effects produced by these relations. Furthermore, dispositifs 
operated in two distinct ways: the first is to shape, as far as possible, the outcomes of activi-
ties and events (“functional overdetermination”); the second is to respond and to attempt to 
control and/or redirect unexpected events (“strategic elaboration”). This makes a dispositif a 
dynamic entity and the nexus from within which the day-to-day activity of social reproduc-
tion is formed, maintained, and channelled. It can be characterised as a ‘management sys-
tem’ through which particular sets of values (in the Nietzschean sense) and normalisations 
(in the Foucaultian sense) are implemented. (It can also be understood as a form of politi-
cised discursive formation, a point that will be returned to below).  
It is also clear that Foucault sees a dispositif as a crucial means through which rela-
tions of forces—the various “capillaries,” “vectors,” and “blocks” of power that exist—
produce a reciprocally supportive relationship to knowledge.23 A dispositif is in part a meta-
formation of Foucault's argument for the symbiotic existence of power/knowledge: to be in 
a position of power allows a group to access and to generate supporting knowledges; to 
have knowledge is to be able to able to enunciate from an authoritative position and to de-
fine the world around you, as well as (at least partially) to alter or create power relations. 
Foucault also conceptualises dispositifs as immanent structures, i.e. existing in the present 
and producing immediate effects when they reorganise and realign their constituent com-
ponents.24  
However, the discussion so far has only focused on dispositifs as ‘structures in domi-
nance’ and has neglected accounting for how they form and decline.25 The process of gener-
ation is important because it shows—for Foucault at least—how a particular set of power 
relations ‘comes to be’. But the ‘rise to dominance’ is a two sided coin: if one side is a dispos-
itif rising, flip to the other and there is one falling. Both aspects are important because they 
show the complexity through which Foucault understood social and political change.  
 
                                                   
23  Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 27; Foucault, Discipine and Punish, 30; Foucault, “Subject and 
Power”, in Paul Rabinow and Nikolas S. Rose (eds.), The Essential Foucault (New York: New Press, 2003), 
136, respectively.  
24 Deleuze, Foucault, 37; Deleuze, “What is a Dispositif?”; Brenner, “Foucault's New Functionalism”; 
Datta, “Politics and Existence”.  
25 Hardy, “Foucault, Genealogy, Emergence”, 75; Datta, “Politics and Existence”, 296.  
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Proto-dispositifs and ancien-dispositifs  
While Foucault does not devote much time to expanding the concept of dispositifs, he does 
give an intriguing account of a changing dispositif in the History of Sexuality, Vol.1.26 Pub-
lished (in French) in 1976, a year after Discipline and Punish and a year before the Security, 
Territory, Population lectures (1977-78).27 HS1 stands as the mid-point in his use of dispositif 
as a concept. In HS1 Foucault makes a core component of his argument an explanation of 
how the dispositif relating to sexual conduct changed.28 The original dispositif was, as Fou-
cault terms it, one of ‘alliance’ but this later changed to a dispositif of ‘sexuality’.29 The dispos-
itif of alliance was explicitly concerned with tracking familial relations in order to discern 
lineages of descent (especially in terms of inheritance and title) but it also gave considerable 
powers of social control. However, with the social, political, and economic rise of the bour-
geoisie, they were able to exert an increasing focus upon their own assumed sexual exclu-
sivity. The dispositif of sexuality, Foucault argues, was first developed and enacted by the 
bourgeoisie upon themselves:30  
 
…the bourgeoisie made this element [i.e. the dispositif of sexuality] identical with its body…. 
This class must be seen rather as being occupied, from the mid-eighteenth century on, with 
creating its own sexuality and forming a specific body based on it, a “class” body with its 
health, hygiene, descent, and race: the autosexualisation of its body, the incarnation of sex in 
its body, the endogamy of sex and the body.31  
 
What Foucault details in HS1 is the exclusion, subsumption, and, finally, alteration of dif-
ferent parts of one dispositif (alliance) into another (sexuality). Importantly is it not a sudden 
change. What we gain from Foucault's account is that in this instance the dispositif of sexual-
ity grew out of the narcissism of one particular social group (the bourgeoisie) and achieved 
a dominant position only later as part of the wider rise of that social group. At no point 
does Foucault claim that the sexuality dispositif was ‘destined’ to become dominant; it was 
presumably merely one of many (what this paper terms) ‘proto-’dispositifs concerning sexu-
al conduct, but one that happened to become dominant because of the wider rise of the 
bourgeoisie.  
                                                   
26 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol.1 (New York: Vintage Books, 1990). In text, hereafter HS1. 
27 Foucault, Discipine and Punish; Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège De 
France, 1977-1978, edited by Michel Senellart and Arnold Ira Davidson (Basingstoke [England]: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007).  
28 Importantly, Bussolini notes that Robert Hurley, in his translation of History of Sexuality, Vol.1, opts for 
an unusual choice of “deployment” as the translation for dispositif (Bussolini, “What is a Dispositive?”, 
86).  
29 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol.1, 106.  
30 It was only later that control of the labouring classes in the form of their reproductive capacities became 
an issue—i.e. while sexuality came to be a means of repression it did not start out as a class repression 
mechanism.  
31 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol.1, 124.  
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This focus upon the rise to dominance of a proto-dispositif can also be found in Fou-
cault's Security, Territory, Population lectures, which Foucault gave only a year after publish-
ing HS1.32 In discussing the changing dominant forms of power relations—from sover-
eign/subject, to disciplinary/individual, to governmental/population—Foucault highlights 
the important role that a proto-dispositif played in one of the earliest concrete formulations 
of ‘security’. Rising to prominence in French political economy/economics was the “physio-
cratic doctrine;” this focused upon the “freedom of commerce and the circulation of grain 
[which] began to be laid down as the fundamental principle of economic government.”33 
The physiocrat argument is an important development in the generation of the concept of 
“security.” It is also important because the physiocrats achieved this by constructing a pro-
to-dispositif.  
 
[…] [T]he physiocrats […] tried to arrive at an apparatus (dispositif) for arranging things so 
that, by connecting up with the very reality of the fluctuations, and by establishing a series 
of connections with other elements of reality, the phenomenon [i.e. scarcity] is gradually 
compensated for, checked, finally limited, and, in the final degree, cancelled out, without it 
being prevented or losing any of its reality. In other words, by working within the reality of fluc-
tuations between abundance/scarcity, dearness/cheapness, and not by trying to prevent it in 
advance, an apparatus is installed, which is, I think, precisely an apparatus of security and 
no longer a juridical-disciplinary system.34  
 
There are two aspects that Foucault raises here, both of which need to be identified and un-
picked: first, what is the form of the physiocrat (proto-)dispositif; second, what does it con-
cretely do? The first question is specific to the topic of this paper, while the second is situat-
ed within Foucault’s wider work. Slightly counter-intuitively, it is easier to answer the first 
by initially focusing upon the second. The physiocrat dispositif differed from the previous 
juridical-disciplinary form of regulation because it aims to nullify scarcity when it occurs 
rather than attempting to prevent scarcity before it occurs. The nullification within the phys-
iocrat dispositif is achieved through price mechanisms: areas with grain scarcity are allowed 
to increase grain prices which draws in grain sellers keen to make profit. The dispositif re-
configures scarcity as a part of the “naturalness” of the world, so it is not something to be 
prevented (any more than humans can ‘prevent’ the changing of the seasons) but, instead, it 
must be offset (like storing food for consumption during winter when none can be grown).35 
Scarcity continues to occur, but its effects are now offset by price mechanisms that attract 
grain sellers toward the area(s) most in need. Scarcity is therefore nullified, not because it 
ceases to exist, but because it is met with an equal response that is a direct result of post-
physiocrat ‘rewired’/‘realigned’ social relations.  
                                                   
32 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population.  
33 Ibid., 33.  
34 Ibid., 37.  
35 Ibid., 70.  
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Foucault's analysis highlights important internal reformations to social relations.36 
Initially, three types of elements can be theorised as being realigned by the dispositif: (i) the 
extra-discursive, (ii) the discursive, and (iii) the strategic/political. To give these context, the 
extra-discursive consists of the volume of grain produced, the variability of abundance and 
scarcity, etc.; the discursive consists of the connections maintained between different con-
cepts, definitions, statements, etc.; while the strategic/political elements are the manoeuv-
rings necessary to exclude, refute, defeat, and impose, etc. the physiocrat dispositif over and 
above the existing juridical-disciplinary system. What this shows is the “thoroughly hetero-
geneous ensemble” of which Foucault spoke, where elements are subject to “shifts of posi-
tion and modifications of function” and which are, importantly, responses to an “urgent 
need”.37 The form of a dispositif changes period to period, circumstance to circumstance; but 
the role of the dispositif is always the same: to attempt to manage and to successfully incor-
porate, subsume, or at least nullify disparate and problematic events, elements, and forces. 
The dispositif is able to do this because it brings an event, element, or force into its prior set 
of relations, its ‘framework’, that ascribes both knowledge and a location to the elements 
within it.  
However, the rise of a proto-dispositif necessarily denotes the ‘eclipse’ of another. As 
has already been examined, Foucault himself engaged with two instances of dispositif 
change: sexual conduct and grain scarcity. In Foucault's analysis, a proto-dispositif is formed 
through the actions and strategies of particular social groups—e.g. the bourgeoisie, the 
physiocrats, etc. Assuming it is able to dislodge the existing dispositif, a proto-dispositif be-
comes the new ‘actual’ dispositif and the former ‘actual’ dispositif becomes, what may be 
termed, a ‘prior-’ or an ‘ancien-’dispositif. Importantly, the new dispositif is not (usually) free 
to simply impose new circumstances upon the old; there is no social tabula rasa. To employ 
a metaphor, the new dispositif has to operate amidst the ruins of the old dispositif. Some of 
the outmoded, unwanted, or simply contradictory elements of the ancien-dispositif will be 
removed or reformed over time, but some elements may be retained. The utility of juridical 
and disciplinary techniques, for instance, were not rejected wholesale from the security dis-
positif; indeed, this is far from the case. What is retained is a new use for a number of old 
techniques. The dispositif of sexuality retained elements of the ancien-dispositif of alliance, 
with its focus on lineage and social control. Change takes time to stabilise and, while it is 
always rendered so as to appear a normal and natural progression, it is difficult to think of 
an example when a previous dispositif was completely excluded in one single moment.38 The 
echoes of previous practice(s) endure in social relations and one of Foucault's many theoret-
ical strengths is in realising and incorporating this into his theory.  
 
                                                   
36 See Datta (“From Foucault’s Genealogy to Aleatory Materialism”, 289) on Foucault’s sometime slippag-
es between accounts of the material world and the material world itself.  
37 Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh”, 194-195.  
38 Foucault, “Questions of Method”, 249-250.  
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Developing the Foucaultian concept of dispositif  
A small number of theorists have explicitly engaged with the concept of dispositif and it is to 
their work that the analysis now turns. One of the most detailed single developments of 
Foucault’s argument is by Deleuze.39 Dispositifs, Deleuze argues, consist of “lines of visibil-
ity and enunciation, lines of force, lines of subjectification, [and] lines of splitting, breakage, 
[and] fracture.”40 As with Foucault’s account, this understands a dispositif to operate in mul-
tiple ways. The dispositif creates the circumstances of what can be seen, i.e. what is ‘identifi-
able’ to the observer; what are the things that can be said, as well as who is able to say them; 
the (re)organisation and (re)linkage of ‘relations of force’;41 the creation of types of subjectiv-
ity that correspond to relations within the dispositif; and—of huge importance—
unavoidable (but continually shifting) lines of inconsistency, contradiction, and fragmenta-
tion that create circumstances for change. The Deleuzeian concept of dispositif is also an 
immanent structure, distinguishing itself from other dispositifs and, importantly, from its 
prior form(s):  
 
We belong to dispositifs and act within them. The newness of a dispositif in relation to those 
which have gone before is what we call its actuality, our actuality. The new is the current. 
The current is not what we are but rather what we are in the process of becoming—that is 
the Other, our becoming-other. In each dispositif it is necessary to distinguish what we are 
(what we are already no longer), and what we are in the process of becoming: the historical 
part and the current part.42  
 
Deleuze identifies a dispositif as effecting two things: “lines of stratification or sedimentation 
and lines leading to the present day or creativity.”43 The previously identified elements of 
seeing, saying, force, and subjectification operate to create a circumscribed—and, im-
portantly, external—past that is continually re-thought within the confines of the present 
dispositif (this is arguably a good example to highlight Foucault's comment regarding the 
“history of the present”44).  
A dispositif also operates to constantly shape the present by providing, as Foucault 
termed it, “functional overdetermination”.45 This quite abstract (and very Althusserian!) 
term means that the dispositif operates to ‘shape’ both repetitive events and social relations, 
making them ‘fit’ within the dispositif’s overall relations. This is what Deleuze argues are the 
“lines leading to the present day:”46 the continuous creation of the present. What is found in 
Deleuze's account of dispositifs, therefore, is an increased level of abstraction from Foucault's 
                                                   
39 Deleuze, “What is a Dispositif?”  
40 Ibid., 162.  
41 Arguably the most consistent element in Foucault's conceptualisation of ‘power’.  
42 Deleuze, “What is a Dispositif?”, 164.  
43 Ibid., 165.  
44 Foucault, Discipine and Punish, 31.  
45 Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh”, 195.  
46 Deleuze, “What is a Dispositif?”, 165. 
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own analyses, but also a formulation of dispositifs that brings the concept firmly into 
Deleuze's own, and arguably more ‘fluid’, conception of social relations.  
Deleuze's analysis offers a strong foundation for development and the analyses by 
Brenner, Bussolini, and Datta build upon it. While there is not space here to go fully into 
Brenner’s argument, he outlines an intriguing position where he posits that Foucault’s theo-
ry often incorporates a level of “new functionalism.”47 Brenner disassociates the concept 
from those established by Parsons, Luhmann, etc. and instead argues that Foucault's func-
tions “do not cause their own fulfilment because they are always already embedded in the 
same historically specific social processes whose rationale and logic they describe.”48 They 
are not (teleologically) ‘present in order to be filled’, but instead are ‘products of’ the very 
maelstrom of social conflict(s) that Foucault argues are continually present and from which 
relations of domination are produced.49 Dispositifs are important for Brenner, because they 
amalgamate effective functions—i.e. techniques and tactics of successful subordination—
and enable their transition and reutilisation across a range of otherwise diverse social prac-
tices (e.g. army discipline moving into schools).50 For Brenner, then, it appears that a disposi-
tif is (mostly) focused upon maintaining concretely effective tactics and techniques (i.e. 
‘what works’) in maintaining subordination. Importantly, Brenner is also explicit that “no 
single power dispositif could ever completely fix all social relations within the spatio-
temporal grid… and thereby attain definitive closure”—there is always the chance for 
change and difference.51  
In another formulation of Deleuze’s position, Bussolini argues that Foucault’s dispos-
itif should be understood as being “onto-creative.”52 This explicitly emphasises the con-
structive aspects of Foucault's account. But Bussolini argues that Deleuze goes further than 
this, with Deleuze arguing Foucault was responding “to a crisis in [his] thought.”53 As 
Rajchman has noted (see Shumway for an even stronger articulation54), Foucault's move to 
genealogy can be understood as a means to bring in politics and conflict into his analysis 
where previously they had focused on the close analysis of texts.55 As such, Bussolini ar-
gues, Deleuze understands Foucault’s dispositif as crucial for “discerning possibilities for 
                                                   
47 Brenner, “Foucault's New Functionalism”, 685.  
48 Ibid., 688 and 689, emphasis added.  
49 For instance, a dominant group, in order to maintain their dominance, has a ‘functional need’ for tech-
niques to keep subordinate groups in a position of subordination; but before the dominant group was 
dominant there were no ‘functional needs’ for subordinating others precisely because there were no oth-
ers to subordinate. 
50 Brenner, “Foucault's New Functionalism”, 692 and 699.  
51 Ibid., 701.  
52 Bussolini, “What is a Dispositive?”, 100.  
53 Ibid., 101.  
54 David R. Shumway, Michel Foucault (Virginia: University Press of Virginia, 1989).  
55 John Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 
115-117.  
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resistance and for the elaboration of new subjectivities.” 56  In this way, Bussolini (via 
Deleuze) understands a dispositif to be a particular system of order being stamped upon so-
cial relations and entities that are in a state of flux and uncertainty. This could possibly be 
characterised as the ‘continuous relations of encoding’ that perpetually recreate the present; 
but it is at those moments of encoding there are (à la Brenner above) possibilities for differ-
ence and change.  
Datta, developing his argument across several works, also draws on Deleuze's anal-
ysis.57 He integrates a number of Foucault's texts and provides an overview of (what this 
paper has termed) a dispositif in dominance.58 In an intriguing elaboration of the dispositif 
concept, Datta argues that it “produce[s] the effect of hegemonisation in society.”59 The 
multiple elements contained within the ‘multi-linear ensemble’ of the dispositif produce a 
(largely) stable and (largely) consistent set of limited discursive forms. These discursive 
forms are continually reaffirmed to subjects—e.g. the primacy of an unfettered free-
market—and constitute the dominant framework from which a subject draws when making 
choices regarding possible courses of action.60 By constricting the content of the discursive 
framework, it restricts possible thought while within that framework—and so the circum-
stances of “hegemonisation” are produced.61  
Datta also emphasises that dispositifs are “Foucault's unique contribution to the theo-
rizing of rule.”62 Datta argues that no other theorist develops such an articulate account of 
the ‘cut and thrust’ mechanisms through which dominant groups, day-to-day, maintain 
their social position. Alongside hegemony (which is necessarily discursive/ideological), dis-
positifs are also the means by which one particular ‘blueprint’ of social relations is continual-
ly (re)asserted. This brings in Foucault's linkage to “overdetermination:” dispositifs vastly 
increase the possibility that an event’s outcome (so long as it is within the boundaries of the 
dispositif) will manifest in a particular manner and form.  
Combining all of these developmental accounts, several insights are made. The first 
is Deleuze's development of the immanent effects of a dispositif and its continual effects to 
‘shape the future.’ A dispositif purposefully gives shape to routine occurrences as well as 
attempting to regulate chance occurrences. Bussolini’s magnification of the Deleuzeian po-
sition sites a dispositif as taking an even stronger role in shaping present and future circum-
stance. Datta’s engagement brings in a welcome development to Foucault's political ac-
                                                   
56 Bussolini, “What is a Dispositive?”, 102.  
57 Ronjon Paul Datta, “Security and the Void: Aleatory Materialism Contra Governmentality”, in Mark 
Neocleous and George Rigakos (eds.), Anti-Security (Red Quill Books, 2011); Datta, “Politics and 
Existence”; Datta, “From Foucault’s Genealogy to Aleatory Materialism”.  
58 Michel Foucault, “Clarifications on the Question of Power”, in Sylvère Lotringer (ed.), Foucault Live 
(New York: Semiotext(e), 1996); Foucault, Discipine and Punish; Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol.1; 
Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh”.  
59 Datta, “Politics and Existence”, 296.  
60 Ibid., 297.  
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid., 296.  
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counts of power. Expanding Deleuze’s argument, dispositifs are understood to create the 
very mental landscape in which subjects operate. To adapt Bussolini’s term, Datta sees dis-
positifs as ‘episto-creative’. Furthermore, Datta’s argument advances Foucault's position that 
dispositifs create fields of overdetermination. This means that a dispositif reduces possible 
outcomes, making sure that from those reduced possibilities the vast majority of concrete 
outcomes fit the ‘blueprint’ of social relations most amenable to the dominant social 
group.63 This is also the link to explaining the stability of social forms and social relations: 
such stability exists, in large part, because a dispositif is active to restrict difference and varia-
tion. What occurs is always simply ‘more of the same’.  
But is this as far as Foucault’s concept of dispositif can be taken? By integrating Fou-
cault’s various accounts the argument was made that a dispositif forms first as a discursive 
formation (a point that will be returned to below) that becomes increasingly politicised, this 
morphs into a proto-dispositif, then finally a dispositif in dominance. Its constitution is from 
of a variety of elements, held together by certain internal relations (which ‘is’ the dispositif 
itself) and which create multiple external effects. Finally, a dispositif operates as a mecha-
nism through which the strategic aims of a dominant social group is able to ‘shape’ social 
relations, but also to respond to emergencies and crises. From the developmental accounts 
of Deleuze, Brenner, Bussolini, Agamben, and Datta, dispositifs become an increasingly 
powerful means through which social and discursive reality is constantly held in a kind of 
stasis, with discourses and events continually being shaped to fit the parameters established 
by the dispositif.  
While bringing together Foucault's diverse arguments into one place certainly adds 
clarity to his concept of dispositif, this paper makes an additional argument: that, specifical-
ly, Foucault's account of dispositifs and chance events is, at the same time, undertheorised yet 
essential for his account of what a dispositif is meant to ‘do’. Chance occurrences are always 
present as factors in three different levels of Foucault's argument: major disruptions (e.g. 
delinquents), anticipated problems (e.g. scarcity), and establishing new political influence 
(e.g. the physiocrat doctrines). All three are important, yet Foucault does not offer a suitable 
theorisation of either what ‘chance’ is or how is it contained within the boundaries of a dis-
positif. ‘Theorising chance’ is not as outlandish as it first may sound, as the following dis-
cussion of Louis Althusser will hopefully establish.64  
 
Deepening the concept of dispositif  
Althusser’s dispositive  
Foucault is not the only theorist to utilise a theoretical device such as a dispositif. Althusser 
also uses the concept, but in his work it takes on quite a different role: that of promoting 
and supporting revolutionary politics and struggle and he places much heavier emphasis 
                                                   
63 Datta, “Security and the Void”, 221-222.  
64 Cf. Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); 
Jacques Monod, Necessity and Chance, translated by Austryn Wainhouse (Vintage Books, 1972).  
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on its theoretical abstractness.65 In an intriguing development that will be discussed below, 
Gregory Elliott, the translator of Machiavelli and Us, chose to translate ‘dispositif’ as “disposi-
tive.”66, 67 An Althusserian dispositif (to avoid any confusion, from hereon only the term 
‘dispositive’ will be used in relation to Althusser) is significant because it is the means 
through which a theorist is able to, first, abstractly identify the force relations that constitute 
a “crystallised historical conjuncture” and then, second, theorise the relations between those 
social forces.68 A dispositive is also the means to theorise the circumstances necessary for 
creating what Althusser termed a “void:” this is a theoretical elaboration of the possibilities 
(both internal and external) associated with a particular conjuncture.69 These points are not 
as trite as they may first appear; for what a dispositive does is to articulate (in the form of 
theoretical discourse) the circumstance(s) in which social change may occur. While this ini-
tially may seem to place Althusser at odds with Foucault, on closer inspection Althusser’s 
argument is not that far from Foucault’s. In Foucault’s articulation of the physiocrat proto-
dispositif, for example, the physiocrats laboured hard to reconceptualise social relations in 
order to produce different outcomes.  
Althusser first detailed his idea of a dispositive in his analysis of the work of Niccolò 
Machiavelli.70, 71 In Machiavelli and Us , Althusser offers a sustained analysis of Machiavelli’s 
study of the failure of long-lasting or effective government to form in Renaissance Italy. Al-
thusser’s interest lies in Machiavelli's ability to “think under the conjuncture”—i.e. to think 
partially ‘outside’ of his present circumstances.72 Machiavelli’s breakthrough, Althusser ar-
gues, is being able to see that history is not infused with a telos (an inherent logic), a Begin-
ning, nor an End, but is instead constituted by particular “relations of forces” that Althusser 
                                                   
65  Nick Hardy, “Theory from the Conjuncture: Althusser’s Aleatory Materialism and Machiavelli's 
Dispositif”, Décalages: an Althusser studies journal, vol. 1, no. 3 (2012).  
66 Althusser, Machiavelli and Us; Elliott, “Introduction: In the Mirror of Machiavelli”, xviii.  
67 Interestingly, Elliott states this decision was taken after extensive discussion with David Macey, the 
long-time translator of many of Foucault’s works. For a similar, but different analysis, see Bussolini, 
“What is a Dispositive?”, 86. 
68  Louis Althusser, “The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter”, in François 
Matheron and Oliver Corpet (eds.), Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings, 1978-87 (London & New 
York: Verso, 2006), 170; Althusser, Machiavelli and Us, 19.  
69 Althusser, Machiavelli and Us, 42.  
70 See Fillippo Del Lucchese, “On the Emptiness of the Encounter: Althusser's Reading of Machiavelli”, 
Décalages, vol. 1, no. 1 (2012), for a broad overview of Althusser and Machiavelli.  
71 While there is no space here for a discussion of Althusser and Foucault on Machiavelli, it is discussed in 
Adam Holden and Stuart Elden, ““It Cannot Be a Real Person, a Concrete Individual”: Althusser and 
Foucault on Machiavelli's Political Technique”, Borderlands, vol. 4, no. 2 (2005); Paul-Erik Korvela, 
“Sources of Governmentality: Two Notes on Foucault’s Lecture”, History of the Human Sciences, vol. 25, 
no. 4; and Robyn Marasco, “Machiavelli Contra Governmentality”, Contemporary Political Theory, vol. 11, 
no. 4 (2012). It is sufficient to say here that Machiavelli constitutes a theoretical divergence rather than a 
convergence between Althusser and Foucault.  
72 Althusser, Machiavelli and Us, 18.  
Hardy: Alea Capta Est 
 206 
terms “conjunctures.”73 A conjuncture is constituted by a myriad of “relations of forces” 
that varyingly intersect, interlink, overlay, support, and contest one another, giving a par-
ticular historical moment/period its form and shape (e.g. feudalism, capitalism, etc.).  
Machiavelli composed his dispositive of three otherwise contradictory statements 
brought together in a particular alignment. They were: (1) that social relations are enduring, 
(2) that social relations are subject to constant change, and (3) that social relations are cycli-
cal.74 However, instead of creating analytical failure—i.e. constituting gibberish, opinion, or 
mere wishes—the dispositive allowed Machiavelli to theorise the three elements beyond 
their existing relationship. Althusser argues that the way in which Machiavelli set the three 
statements in relation to one another opened up a “void” of possibility.75  
This seemingly strange concept of ‘the void’ forms an important part of Althusser's 
later work on aleatory materialism.76, 77 Aleatory materialism means ‘chance’ materialism and 
for the present discussion it is sufficient to understand it as arguing that social structures: 
(a) originally form through the chance encounters of their elements; (b) have managed to 
endure in their form(s); and (c) overdetermine other structures, meaning the others develop 
in a similar form.78 Althusser's interest in the void is because it signifies the possibility of 
aleatory change—i.e. change not expected to be produced from the forces as presently con-
figured in the conjuncture.79 In aleatory materialist terms, the void is the non-space in 
which chance is played out and contains the possibility of both formation and of effect: that 
is, chances of encounter and chances of outcome. The implication/result of the void is the 
creation of possibilities, which is why Althusser places so much emphasis upon it.  
Althusser's fascination with Machiavelli's dispositive was that, as a theoretical as-
semblage, it enabled the conceptualisation of a means to nullify and to transcend—i.e. move 
beyond—present circumstance. Being locked in the cycle of ineffective government in the 
historical conjuncture of sixteenth century Italian politics meant that Machiavelli's theory 
had to reorder that conjuncture and treat it as one possible relation of forces—albeit one that 
                                                   
73 Althusser, “The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter”, 189; ibid., 170; Althusser, 
“On Genesis”, Décalages 1, no. 2 (2012); Katja Kolšek, “The Parallax Object of Althusser's Materialist 
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“Theory from the Conjuncture”; Datta, “From Foucault’s Genealogy to Aleatory Materialism”; François 
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was presently ‘actual’. Using the concept of the void, Althusser identifies precisely that el-
ement which Machiavelli hoped would be accessed by a successful Prince: chance. Fortuna 
would grant the Prince chance opportunities by destabilising conjunctural relations, and the 
virtù possessed by the Prince would enable them to grasp (as well as possibly even create) 
the chance of change and then also make that change occur. The huge importance that Al-
thusser placed upon the dispositive was that it (at least in theory) constructed the circum-
stances in which the void may be encountered. For Machiavelli, it was the Prince-figure 
who would open up this possibility. For Althusser, it was the combination of political 
struggle and structural change.80  
Althusser sadly did little to expand his argument regarding dispositives, but what is 
immediately useful about Althusser's work—especially for Foucaultian theory—is that the 
concept of a dispositive contains two things: first, an account of ‘thinking outside of the 
present’; and second, an emphasis upon the value of fluctuation, disruption, and difference. 
Althusser’s attempt to find a theoretical means by which to analyse aleatory events appears 
to be in marked contrast to much of Foucault’s work which only articulates ‘responses to’ 
aleatory events (the exception being, as has already been noted, aspects of the proto-
dispositif). However, by both adopting a more rigorous approach to both defining and theo-
rising aleatory events (taken from a partial integration of Althusser’s approach to Foucault), 
Foucault's concept of dispositif could be greatly strengthened. It is to this task that the dis-
cussion now turns.  
 
Developing aleatory accounts  
As argued above, aleatory events constitute a key, albeit very small, area of Foucault’s dispos-
itif and consequently require theoretical development. There are several ways of interpret-
ing “aleatory”—which simply means ‘chance’—so to talk of aleatory events means nothing 
more than ‘occurrences not purposefully created’. Foucault’s account of the creation of de-
linquency by the disciplinary prison system serves as a good example of the most extreme 
kind: events which are utterly unexpected and pose a serious threat to the status quo of so-
cial relations. A second form are those known to likely occur (e.g. grain scarcity) but not 
when or where they might occur. The effect of these events can be estimated with some cer-
tainty (such as how people many people may starve) but not how frequently they might 
occur. A third form is the creation of possibilities: this entails the likelihood of variation in the 
(repeated) form of a current object, of an alternate form of an object, or even the rejection of 
an object altogether; all are ‘possibilities’. Both Althusser and Foucault incorporate the ‘alea-
tory’ into their work, both in terms of dispositives/dispositifs playing a key role in theorising 
and articulating aleatory events, but also in attempting to exert some form of control over 
an aleatory event.81 (Indeed, this is Foucault’s entire point in detailing the establishment of 
                                                   
80 Nick Hardy, “Wolff, Althusser, and Hegel: Outlining an Aleatory Materialist Epistemology”, Rethinking 
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the dispositif of security.) The differences between these three types of aleatory event—the 
unexpected, the securitised, and the possible—is what separates Althusser's and Foucault’s 
accounts of the aleatory. Yet if an attempt to account for them is made, then three conceptu-
al frameworks are generated: aleatory capture (for the unexpected), aleatory nullification 
(for security), and aleatory production (for possibilities).  
The argument being made in this paper is that by gaining insight from Althusser's 
concept of a dispositive, a strengthening of Foucault's concept of a dispositif can be achieved. 
This would alter the concept of dispositifs so they become a more theoretically active re-
source, rather than being descriptive and largely passive. This is a reading that moves Fou-
cault’s dispositif from the part of his work that is, as Deleuze has termed it, the analytical 
(i.e. analysis of the past) to the diagnostic (i.e. interrogation of the present).82 Integrating in-
sights from Althusser into Foucault’s concept of dispositif creates an expanded concept ca-
pable of examining immediate social relations as well as historical circumstances. All of the 
elements of a dispositif already identified above are retained: (i) that its form comes from the 
arrangement of the discursive and extra-discursive elements within it; (ii) that it operates to 
maintain the dominance of a particular social group; and (iii) that it creates a field of over-
determination within its boundaries. What will be added to it is a more articulate account of 
how a dispositif captures, controls, and creates aleatory events.  
 
Foucault and Althusser: aleatory capture and aleatory nullification  
Both Foucault and Althusser have an understanding of dispositifs that incorporates a form of 
‘aleatory capture’. In Foucault’s analysis there was a heavier emphasis upon aleatory cap-
ture, where he focused upon the ability to respond to unexpected events.83 In responding to 
unexpected events, a dispositif either subsumes (and so reforms) an aleatory event into the 
dispositif’s existing structure, or the dispositif reforms itself in order to incorporate the unal-
terable traits of the aleatory event. Either way, it entails strategic manoeuvring in order to 
ensure the continued dominance of that dispositif (and its associated social group).  
Part “functional overdetermination”, part ‘nullification by design’, a dispositif has a 
capacity to both restrict possibilities and to offset known eventualities. In restricting possi-
bilities, a dispositif acts though its immanent structure and form to produce a field of overde-
termination so reducing aleatory possibilities. This is how, within Foucaultian theory, dis-
positifs are key for producing spheres of social stability. Abilities to nullify aleatory events 
were part of the very design of (some) dispositifs. This is different to ‘simple’ overdetermina-
tion, because the social and natural forces requiring nullification necessitate a specific shape 
and form to a dispositif.84 Dispositifs reduce the possibility of disruptions to social relations 
                                                   
82 Deleuze, “What is a Dispositif?” 164.  
83 e.g. the emergence of a delinquent criminality in Foucault, Discipine and Punish, 276-277; Foucault, “The 
Confession of the Flesh”, 195-196.  
84 For example, the overdetermined shape and structure of the family will take its form largely from the 
dominant dispositif, but the family does not need a specific dispositif in which to form in the first place (i.e. 
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(by overdetermining the type and form of subjects and entities produced within them), but 
also offer the possibility to offset those events that do still arise unexpectedly.  
For Althusser, meanwhile, aleatory capture is a much smaller feature for a disposi-
tive. A dispositive operates much less to capture empirical aleatory events rather then to 
attempt to create aleatory events (this is discussed further below). Where a dispositive does 
attempt to capture aleatory circumstances (and this may be stretching the concept of ‘cap-
ture’ too far) is through the form of theory, examining why more aleatory moments have 
not occurred—e.g. why a particular set of social relations continually repeat themselves in 
the form(s) that they do. This is an attempt to ‘capture’ circumstances in the form of theoret-
ical representation and discourse.  
In terms of the nullification of aleatory events, Althusser does not conceive of a dis-
positive operating in this way. The closest an Althusserian perspective may produce in this 
manner is the theoretical form of the dispositive creates conclusions that nullify (theoretical-
ly at least) the powers inherent in particular social forces. From this nullification comes the 
possibility for political action and struggle.85  
 
Foucault and Althusser: aleatory production  
Where both Foucault and Althusser share a focus is on the production of aleatory circum-
stances. While for Althusser this is not at all contentious, for Foucault this may seem to go 
beyond the discussion of dispositifs made so far. However, by viewing proto-dispositifs as 
concerted attempts at altering the status quo/dominant dispositif, then Foucault's account 
does indeed include attention to the production of aleatory events.  
For Althusser the entire purpose of a dispositive is to theorise how to destabilise so-
cial relations and to increase the likelihood of aleatory circumstance entering into social rela-
tions. To utilise Datta’s appealing formulation of Althusser's concept of underdetermination, 
a dispositive attempts (in the form of a theoretical construct) to release, expand, or create 
new possibilities from the potentialities present within existing social relations.86 This is not 
a theoretical version of alchemy—i.e. transmogrifying one substance, in this case a ‘con-
cept’, into another—but it is an express attempt to unlock ‘possible futures’ contained with-
in particular social relations. Consequently, Althusser's dispositive can be understood as a 
theoretical interruption. It enables the theorist to engage with an issue and to attempt to ne-
gate one or more of the operating elements.  
For Foucault, meanwhile, the effort and effect of creating aleatory circumstances is 
somewhat different. While he does not focus in the same way as Althusser on such an ex-
plicitly political project, he does articulate a strong account of how proto-dispositifs are stra-
                                                                                                                                                                    
there are always children being born). However, for nullification to operate a specific form of the dispositif 
is required: scarcity is not nullified by the juridical-disciplinary dispositif, but it is by the security dispositif.  
85 Louis Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings, 1978-87, edited by François Matheron and 
Oliver Corpet, translated by G. M. Goshgarian (London ; New York: Verso, 2006), 189; see also Machiavelli 
and Us, 81-103.  
86 Datta, “Security and the Void”, 221-222.  
Hardy: Alea Capta Est 
 210 
tegic attempts to influence existing social relations and, if achieved, to then create new rela-
tions from them.  
What can be found in Foucault's work is a continued emphasis upon the struggles 
for dominance found within any social relations.87 While events can, at times, overtake the 
strategies of particular groups (dominant or not) and radically alter the landscape of social 
relations, more often than not chance occurs through a combination of strategy and circum-
stance. Some of this may be through the efforts of a particular group to advance (what they 
deem to be) their interests, but change comes about by destabilising existing relations—by 
creating aleatory opportunities. While this may not contain the same analytics as Althusser 
(i.e. explicitly theorising one’s immediate social relations), it does contain a strong emphasis 
towards breaking the repetitive pattern of events that continually form in a set number of 
ways (i.e. they are overdetermined).  
 
Dispositifs, discursive formations, and thresholds  
Bringing together Foucault’s and Althusser’s differing conceptions of dispositifs/dispositives 
has enabled an increased level of theoretical complexity. While Foucault retains the more 
developed position vis-à-vis Althusser—especially after incorporating the developmental 
analyses discussed above—his work still benefits from integrating elements of Althusser’s 
account, such as conceptualising aleatory events and nullification. Thus, with the Al-
thusserian argument incorporated, a dispositif can be understood to operate as a means of 
imposing three types of restriction upon aleatory events: first, a ‘continuous present’ exert-
ed upon objects and subjects; second, overdetermining repetitious occurrences; and, third, 
negating many of the effects of unexpected aleatory events. Furthermore, the proto-
dispositifs identified in Foucault's accounts of “sexuality” and “security” demonstrate at-
tempts to create aleatory possibilities in order to bring about changes in existing social rela-
tions. Combining these different facets of the proto- and dominant-dispositif together, a 
more detailed understanding of their operation is possible. Therefore, the argument will 
now turn to an attempt to give dispositifs a firmer structure and process, established by 
identifying a series of thresholds that a dispositif passes through, similar to the thresholds as-
sociated with a discursive formation.  
Outlined in Foucault's The Archaeology of Knowledge a discursive formation is a ‘sys-
tem of dispersion’ within which objects, statements, concepts, and themes are ordered into 
particular relations with one another, so producing (or excluding) particular discourses.88 
                                                   
87 e.g. Michel Foucault, Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1973-74, edited by Jacques 
Lagrange, François Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Michel 
Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”; Foucault, “Subject and Power”; Michel Foucault, “Truth and 
Juridical Forms”, in James D. Faubion (ed.), Power: The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984 (New York: 
New Press, 2000); Foucault, Discipine and Punish.  
88 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 38-68; Danica Dupont and Frank Pearce, “Foucault Contra 
Foucault: Rereading the 'Governmentality' Papers”, Theoretical Criminology, vol. 5, no. 2 (2001), 146-147; 
Hardy, “Foucault, Genealogy, Emergence”; Lecourt, Marxism and Epistemology: Bachelard, Canguilhem and 
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While discursive formations are outlined in detail elsewhere, both the ‘form’ and the ‘oper-
ation’ of a discursive formation are of interest to the discussion here because discursive 
formations are strikingly similar to a dispositifs.89  
Foucault argues that the form of a discursive formation contains four types of regu-
lated element: objects (the material ‘things’ that the discursive formation engages with—e.g. 
the mad); statements (the ‘enunciations’ deemed acceptable, as well the subjects’ deemed 
acceptable to enunciate them—e.g. a psychiatrist passing clinical judgement); concepts (the 
linkages established between different statements—e.g. the diagnosis that ‘hearing voices’ 
signifies schizophrenia); and themes (the differences within a discursive formation between 
competing positions—e.g. electroshock treatment versus psychoanalytic therapy). 90  The 
continuously shifting sands of complementarity and contestation between the elements 
within a discursive formation mean that it should be understood as constantly changing. 
(Although, it should be noted that this is not as ‘quick’ as changes within a dispositif, discur-
sive formations are altogether ‘slower’ assemblages.)  
The operation of a discursive formation produces a ‘discursive environment’ within 
which discourses form, taking their content from the various ‘statements’—the “elementary 
units of discourse”—present within the discursive formation.91 To use some of the argu-
ments developed above, discursive formations overdetermine the discursive possibilities of 
what can and cannot be said within them. For example, within the configuration of the 
medical discursive formation in the 1700s ‘the soul’ was a distinct object of medical treat-
ment, yet the medical discursive formation in the 2000s does not.92 Alongside the dispersion 
of elements, a discursive formation also contains what Foucault terms “rules of for-
mation.”93 These rules govern how the elements are placed into relation to one another. This 
dispersion and regulation create the discursive preconditions from which particular dis-
courses are formed and maintained.  
This brief outline of discursive formations should give at least a surface indication of 
the similarity they have with dispositifs.94 One means of developing the comparison is to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Foucault. n.b. see also Jon Frauley, “Towards an Archaeological-Realist Foucauldian Analytics of 
Government”, British Journal of Criminology, vol. 47, no. 4 (2007).  
89 Nick Hardy, “A History of the Method: Examining Foucault's Research Methodology”, in Benôit Dillet, 
Iain Mackenzie, and Robert Porter (eds.), The Edinburgh Companion to Poststructuralism (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2013); Hardy, “Foucault, Genealogy, Emergence”.  
90 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 41-42, 50-52, 56-59, 65-68.  
91 Ibid., 80.  
92 Hardy, “A History of the Method”; Hardy “Foucault, Genealogy, Emergence”.  
93 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 38.  
94 The similarity discursive formations and dispositifs also extends to Foucault’s concept of épistémè. Out-
lined in Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1994), xxii, and Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 191-192: épistémè is an elusive term that 
Foucault used to encompass the particular dominant ‘form’ of scientific inquiry and knowledge present 
at a particular time (e.g. taxonomical in the 1600s, empirical in the 1800s). However, having dropped the 
concept, Foucault resurrects it in “Confession of the Flesh” to answer a question, stating: “…I would de-
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adopt Rajchman’s distinction between Foucault's archaeologies being ‘textual’ and his ge-
nealogies being ‘political’.95 With this distinction, the argument can be made that Foucault 
develops an existing concept (a discursive formation) but changes the environment in which 
he theorises it to operate. For example:  
 
[W]e could consider Abeille’s [physiocrat] text within an analysis of a theoretical field by 
trying to discover its guiding principles, the rules of formation of its concepts, its theoret-
ical elements, and so on… But I do not want to look at it in this way, and instead of con-
sidering it in terms of an archaeology of knowledge, I would like to consider it from the 
perspective of a genealogy of technologies of power. I think we could reconstruct the 
function of the text, not according to the rules of formation of its concepts, but according 
to its objectives, the strategies that govern it, and the program of political action it pre-
supposes.96  
 
The physiocrat text by Abeille can be understood either as part of a discursive formation or 
as part of a technology of power. The same theoretical object (the physiocrat argument for 
conceptualising, organising, and engaging with the issue of ‘scarcity’) can be understood 
using both archaeological and genealogical perspectives. Relating this explicitly to the ar-
gument here, this possibility of a dual explanation means that proto-dispositifs (like 
Abeille’s) have an internal consistency that is also comprehensible in terms of a discursive 
formation. This is significant because it shows that Foucault understands a dispositif to con-
stitute, at least for a time, a discursive formation which later becomes ‘elevated’ into a pro-
to-dispositif and then a new form of dominant power/knowledge relations (which then be-
comes a dominant dispositif).  
One of the most intriguing elements in Foucault’s account of the generation of dis-
cursive formations are the ‘thresholds’ that Foucault argues they pass through.97 These 
transformations impact upon how discursive formations operate internally and how they 
create effects externally. The four thresholds that Foucault identifies are: (1) positivity, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
fine the épistémè retrospectively as the strategic apparatus which permits of [sic.] separating out from 
among all the statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within, I won’t say a scientific 
theory, but a field of scientificity, and which it is possible to say are true or false. The épistémè is the ‘appa-
ratus’ which makes possible the separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may or may not be 
characterised as scientific” (Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh”, 197). An épistémè is, here, defined in 
the same way as a dispositif, a “strategic apparatus”, but relates solely to scientific inquiry. There is not 
space in this paper to explore Foucault’s analysis of science (cf. Hardy, “A History of the Method”; 
Béatrice Han, Foucault's Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical, translated by Edward 
Pile, Atopia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002); Gary Gutting, Michel Foucault's Archaeology of 
Scientific Reason (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989)), but elements of this will 
be taken up in the following discussion of discursive formations. (I would like to thank the reviewers for 
bringing this later use of épistémè to my attention.)  
95 Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy.  
96 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 35-36, emphasis added.  
97 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 186-189  
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where a discourse becomes a discursive formation;98 (2) epistemologisation, where the dis-
cursive formation establishes internal coherence and becomes a reference point between 
competing knowledge claims; (3) scientificity, where the discursive formation creates and 
then maintains formal rules and criteria for generating knowledge within it; and (4) formal-
isation, the discursive formation contains axiomatic truths and becomes a starting-point in 
and of itself.99  
 
Conceptualising the thresholds of a dispositif  
The similarity between discursive formations and dispositifs allows a parallel series of 
thresholds to be theorised that chart the development of a dispositif from genesis to domi-
nance. The argument here is that, by taking Foucault's own work, the insights from Al-
thusser’s dispositive, and recent scholarly work, four thresholds can be identified as relat-
ing to the development of a dispositif (examples are given below). They are:  
(1) Strategic emergence: a proto-dispositif stage, this is when a discursive formation is 
able to contest social relations comparable to it (i.e. relations similar to the content of the 
discursive formation) but which are ‘within’ another discursive formation.  
(2) Political elaboration: at the end of the proto-dispositif stage but still within it, this 
is when a discursive formation extends its previously localised discursive emphasis and 
connects into existing discourses and power relations external to itself and begins to alter 
them.  
(3) Overdetermined a priori:100 now transformed beyond a discursive formation, this 
is when a dispositif has established power/knowledge networks, structured the relations of 
its internal components, and produces and maintains hegemonic influence; altogether, 
these form the circumstances within which repetitious events gain their form and content.  
(4) Aleatory dominance: when the dispositif has proven able to counteract, subsume, 
or alter unexpected and contradictory events, so maintaining its dominant effects.  
It is worth noting that this is not simply a case of transferring Foucault’s argument 
for the thresholds affecting discursive formations directly onto dispositifs. Originally he ar-
gued that a discursive formation did not necessarily have to pass through all four of the 
thresholds he outlined, and even that they did not have to be achieved in order.101 Howev-
                                                   
98 Agamben (Agamben, “’What is an Apparatus?,'“ 3-6; also Bussolini “‘What is a Dispositive?,’” 102-103) 
makes an interesting observation that Foucault’s early use of the term “positivity” was likely inspired 
from his education by and reading of Jean Hyppolite, a scholar of Hegel. Rather than being the ‘creative’ 
form of positivity found in Foucault’s later work, Agamben argues that positivity in Foucault’s early 
work means (à la Hegel) “a certain historical moment externally imposed on individuals” (Agamben, 
“‘What Is a Apparatus?,’” 4). So, when a discourse passes through a threshold of positivity and becomes a 
discursive formation, it becomes something that, in and of itself, is ‘imposable’ upon the things within it.  
99 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 186; Dupont and Pearce, “Foucault Contra Foucault”, 146.  
100 See Datta, “Politics and Existence”, 296; Datta, “From Foucault’s Genealogy to Aleatory Materialism”, 
277-280. See also Han, Foucault's Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical for a more 
general account of Foucault and the a priori.  
101 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 187-188.  
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er, the overtly political form of a dispositif makes it difficult to conceptualise the thresholds 
being moved through in a different order to the one outlined above. This is not because of 
any developmental need by a dispositif (an analogy of developmental need being that a 
child cannot mature directly into an adult without first having been through adolescence), 
but that the dispositif must necessarily form within contested social spaces. Therefore, if it 
cannot operate to at least withstand attack from other discursive formations and dispositifs 
then it will simply cease to exist; consumed, incorporated, or outright destroyed by its op-
ponents.  
It may also be that the fourth threshold may not occur for long periods of time. The 
example that Foucault gives of delinquency is an example of ‘aleatory dominance’: the 
bourgeois dispositif was able to react to the emergence of a new criminal class successfully, 
negating most of delinquency’s harmful effects (at least the effects upon the bourgeoisie 
and their dispositif).102 Yet a dispositif operating at the third threshold may never have to re-
act to something so severe as that. Thus it is feasible that a dispositif may operate for an in-
definite period of time without facing the emergency of a major contradiction. There would, 
of course, be many conflicts, alterations, and discordances that had to be rectified (for, as 
stated earlier, a dispositif is a dynamic construct in its everyday operation), yet when a major 
crisis occurs it may be beyond a particular dispositif’s abilities to successfully accommodate 
it.  
Using this framework for dispositif thresholds, it is now possible to revisit part of 
Foucault's arguments about dispositifs to see how they are historically composed. Taking the 
example of the physiocrat concern with grain scarcity—and the corresponding conception 
of ‘security’—the following process can be identified.103 Within the discursive formation of 
political economy/economics (hereafter “economics”), the physiocrats were a distinct group 
(the mercantilists, for example, were another) and they agitated and strategised successfully 
to have their discursive position adopted as one of, if not ‘the’, leading perspective within 
the economics discursive formation (threshold 1).  
The physiocrats begin to rise to prominence outside of the economics discursive for-
mation based upon their alternative means of tackling scarcity. The effect of this was that 
associated social relations become increasingly influenced by the physiocrat concept of the 
naturalness of scarcity and its remedy through nullification (rather than the juridical-
disciplinary attempt at ‘prevention’) (threshold 2).  
Over time the concept of ‘naturally occurring scarcity’ becomes superseded by the 
concept of ‘security’ (both ‘nullify’ events, but the latter has a much different discursive ba-
sis than the former). Later developments within economics show the move towards ‘mar-
ginalism’ (where goods are understood to have decreasing utility for purchasers) and, while 
not a direct relation to the physiocrat doctrine, marginalism assiduously maintains the as-
                                                   
102 Foucault, Discipine and Punish.  
103 Care must be taken here to keep distinct the discursive/nominal form of the proposed solution of ‘securi-
ty’ and the material/real/existing effects of actual implementation of ‘security’. (My thanks to the review-
ers for drawing my attention to this potential theoretical slippage.)  
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sumed need for an unfettered free-flow of goods and services only regulated by the market. 
Security, meanwhile, increasingly serves the interests of the dominant social group (the 
bourgeoisie) because it creates an increased level of ‘certainty’ and reliability to social rela-
tions. Consequently, forms of ‘securitisation’ are increasingly inserted into other unrelated 
social relations which coalesce and begin a repetitious cycle by securing a particular form of 
social relations (threshold 3).  
How does this insertion work? Take ‘delinquency’ again as an example: when delin-
quency emerged from the disciplinary prison system occurring at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, the security dispositif had already been active for several decades. It is un-
clear how far Foucault understands the security dispositif to overlap with what he (very 
vaguely) terms the wider “bourgeois dispositif,” but the bourgeois dispositif was certainly the 
key component in altering the police service from simple ‘city watch’ style foot patrols into 
a data gathering and surveillance organisation.104 Through syphoning off certain strains of 
criminality (prostitution, drugs, arms dealing, etc.), periodically utilising others (strike 
breakers, social intimidation, etc.), or outright repression (police surveillance, etc.) the 
bourgeois dispositif was able to absorb, recast, or nullify different elements of the delinquent 
population (threshold 4).105  
By viewing the development of dispositifs as passing through four thresholds, it is 
possible to achieve greater conceptual precision. This means that the various abilities held 
by dispositifs can be attributed to a particular stage of development as well as being broken 
down into their ‘type’ of aleatory operation.  
There is a danger that, if misconstrued, dispositifs can appear to be an ‘easy way out’ 
of explaining complex social change. If misunderstood, dispositifs can appear totalising, al-
most omnipotent, and dangerously close to approximating a conspiratorial entity similar 
to—to paraphrase Marx’s famous quote about the state—nothing more than a means of se-
curing the common interests of the bourgeoisie.106 But Foucault’s dispositif is not this. It is a 
development from a discursive formation and contains all of the conflicts inherent in a dis-
cursive formation but also the multitude of others that come with a Foucaultian conception 
of political rule. The complexity of what a dispositif is, and the wide range of effects that it 
produces, means that dispositifs are worthy of deeper conceptualisation, articulation, and 
understanding than Foucault initially gave them. It is towards this goal that this paper 
hopes it has made some contribution.  
 
Conclusion 
The argument presented here focused on two core points: the first was to elaborate Fou-
cault’s own arguments (backed up by a small number of associated studies) of what exactly 
a dispositif ‘is’. The second was to develop the concept of dispositif to include both a greater 
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awareness of the unique qualities of what a dispositif ‘does’, but also to give a much firmer 
hold on how a dispositif is generated, developed, and then installed. To achieve this, a num-
ber of Foucault's texts were examined that engaged with a fully developed dispositif and 
two instances where a proto-dispositif (as this paper termed it) was developed. After ad-
vancing Foucault's position with insightful additional studies, the later work of Louis Al-
thusser was incorporated for their focus on nullifying conflicting relations and for their fo-
cus on aleatory (‘chance’) circumstances. Foucault's dispositif was then reassessed, bringing 
in not only a stronger understanding of how it engages with different forms of ‘aleatory’ 
events, but also to detail its specific developmental stages which, it was argued, Foucault 
had not previously done. By demonstrating the strong similarities between dispositifs and 
discursive formations, a series of thresholds were argued to exist that a dispositif passes 
through as it increases in size, effect, and influence. The argument’s conclusion was that by 
giving more rigour to the understanding of what a dispositif is and what it does, it means 
that dispositifs can now more easily and successfully form part of contemporary Foucaultian 
analyses.  
Alea capta est.  
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